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Canadians debating the methods and merits of re-stricting access to their national territory by asy-lum seekers and others should consider lessons
from the experience of its southern neighbour. In 1996,
through the enactment of “expedited removal,” the United
States Congress sharply redefined—downward—what
process is due an individual who arrives at its border and is
deemed not to have proper documents to enter. The laws,
first implemented on April 1, 1997, were among the most
controversial provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (iirira) and con-
stitute one of the most fundamental changes in U.S. immi-
gration law and policy in many decades. After more than
three years of experience with the expedited removal proc-
ess, many questions have been raised about the treatment
of individuals by officers of the U.S. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (usins), about the mandatory detention
of asylum seekers, and particularly about the impact and
effect of the elimination of any judicial review. Many im-
migration officers seem very much aware of the unreview-
able finality of their actions, and behave accordingly.
Issues likely to be of particular interest in Canada in-
clude problems encountered in efforts to report on or ob-
serve the exercise of these unprecedented powers by im-
migration authorities, the extent to which usins has come
to rely on expedited removal, and the impact of expedited
removal on Canadian-bound asylum seekers.
Expedited Removal: Unprecedented Unreviewable
Authority
Expedited removal applies to all non-citizens arriving in
the United States who do not have valid or suitable travel
documents, or who attempt entry through fraud or mis-
representation.1 Should a question arise about the docu-
ments presented by an applicant for admission, the indi-
Abstract
Canadians debating the merits of restricting access to the
national territory by asylum seekers and others should
consider the experience of the United States with its new
expedited removal process. Three years after its enactment,
U.S. immigration authorities have come to rely on expe-
dited removal. Yet many troubling questions have been
raised about the treatment by immigration officers of
individuals in expedited removal and about the impact of
the mandatory detention of asylum seekers. A particular
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Résumé
Les Canadiens qui débattent la question de savoir s’il faut
ou non limiter l’accès au territoire national aux
demandeurs d’asile et autres personnes, devraient prendre
le temps de considérer l’expérience des États-Unis avec leur
procédure de renvoi accéléré. Trois ans après sa promulga-
tion, les officiels du Département américain de
l’immigration sont arrivés à dépendre sur le renvoi accéléré.
Cependant, beaucoup des questions troublantes ont été
soulevées à propos du traitement que reçoivent les
personnes en renvoi accéléré aux mains des officiers du
Service de l’immigration et à propos de l’impact de la
détention obligatoire des demandeurs d’asile. Une raison
particulière de s’inquiéter provient de l’élimination de la
sauvegarde fondamentale du recours judiciaire.
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vidual is referred to “secondary inspection” for an inter-
view. In the vast majority of cases, the final decision on a
person’s case is made during this interview at the port of
entry. With the concurrence of a supervising officer, the
individual is issued a five-year bar on entry to the United
States, and then promptly—often immediately—removed.2
The port officers’ determination is not subject to review by
an administrative immigration judge, federal appeals court,
or any other body.3
The U.S. Congress did seek to provide a limited amount
of additional process to two groups subject to the expe-
dited removal laws: asylum seekers and persons who claim
a legal right to remain in the United States.
First, Congress created a procedure to screen the claims
of asylum seekers at the border to decide if they will be
permitted access to the U.S. asylum determination proc-
ess. usins officers conducting secondary inspection inter-
views are required to ask all individuals being found inad-
missible whether they have a fear of return.4 Those who
express such a fear are to be detained and referred to a
screening interview. At this interview, which generally takes
place within a matter of days after the attempted entry, a
usins asylum officer is to determine if the asylum seeker
has a “credible fear” of persecution. Under this standard,
an individual must establish that “there is a significant pos-
sibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements
made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such
other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could
establish eligibility for asylum . . .”5 There is little role for
legal assistance in this process,6 even if an asylum seeker
has sufficient time and money to obtain such assistance.
An individual determined not to have a “credible fear”
may request a limited form of administrative review by an
immigration judge (ij). The ij review generally takes place
within a few days of the asylum officer’s decision, during
which time the applicant remains detained. There is no
appeal from this decision.7 Access to appellate review by
the national Board of Immigration Appeals—which nor-
mally reviews decisions made by ijs—and, beyond that, to
federal court, is barred by law.8
Second, persons who claim to have lawful status in the
United States—including U.S. citizens, legal permanent
residents, and persons with refugee status—are to be de-
tained and referred to an immigration judge for consid-
eration of their claims.9 The ijs determination of the issue
is final; there is no appellate review.10 Those who fail to
establish a “credible fear” during the process, or whose
claims to lawful status are not verified by an inspector or
immigration judge, are summarily removed from the
United States.
As passed by Congress, the expedited removal laws may
be applied not only to persons apprehended at ports of
entry but also to persons who entered the U.S. without in-
spection and cannot establish that they have been physi-
cally present for two years.11 usins has announced a plan to
set up a pilot program, aimed at a specific criminal popu-
lation,12 to begin the exercise of this authority to extend
these broad powers beyond the ports of entry and to use
them to remove persons from within the United States.
Efforts to Observe the Process
usins has resisted efforts to observe and monitor the im-
plementation of its unprecedented new powers. Non-
governmental organizations (ngos) such as the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights and Amnesty International
have been refused access to observe the expedited removal
process. The Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (unhcr) has been granted limited ac-
cess to primary data and on-site observations, but only on
the condition that its observations remain confidential.13
As of October 2000, after two and a half years of expedited
removal, the unhcr had observed a total of two secondary
inspections, and the General Accounting Office (gao) in
its recent report witnessed seven.14 In combination with
the unprecedented elimination of judicial review, this
amounts to a total absence of independent oversight over
a process under which 99 per cent of persons were removed
from the U.S. at secondary inspection,15 often the same day
of their arrival.
The Expedited Removal Study was created in 1997 to
investigate the implementation of these unprecedented
procedures, especially as they apply to asylum seekers. The
Study had planned to engage in a comprehensive statisti-
cal analysis of data, together with extensive on-site obser-
vation at ports of entry. But the Study’s ability to report on
the process has been restricted by the usins’s denial of ac-
cess. Instead, the Study collected data from ngos and at-
torneys that represented individuals subject to the expe-
dited removal process, building a database of up to 100
variables from 924 individual cases over three years.16 After
filing suit under the Freedom of Information Act together
with the Immigrants’ Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union (aclu), the Study also obtained and
analyzed statistics on expedited removal produced by the
usins.17 The Study released annual reports on expedited
removal in May 1998, 1999, and 2000,18 and its evaluation
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of the gao’s September 2000 report on expedited removal
was released in October 2000.19
Congress has twice passed legislation asking its investi-
gative arm, the gao, to report on expedited removal and
determine, among other things, if asylum seekers are be-
ing incorrectly being sent back to their persecutors.20 Un-
fortunately, the gao’s reports have focused on usins man-
agement controls rather than on-site observation and—
just as important—did not seek to evaluate the quality or
accuracy of decisions made by usins during the process.21
As a result, Congress’s questions remain largely unanswered,
and it remains the case that today, nearly four years after
its implementation, the public has been provided with lit-
tle information on the manner in which expedited removal
is being administered.
Expedited Removal in Practice
The central unanswered question about expedited removal
remains the conduct of secondary inspection.
The Study and other ngos have documented many trou-
bling case studies of abuses and mistakes by usins offic-
ers.22 To summarize a few of the cases:
• A young man from Algeria who had suffered deten-
tion and torture in his home country alleges that he
was repeatedly threatened with immediate return by
an ins official after he requested asylum. He became
so desperate at the thought of being sent back that he
stabbed himself in the abdomen, requiring emergency
treatment.
• Two Chinese asylum seekers—one fleeing religious
persecution, the other punishment for violation of
family planning laws—were criminally prosecuted for
their use of false U.S. passports; convictions could
have rendered them ineligible for asylum.
• A native-born U.S. citizen, accused of making a false
claim to U.S. citizenship, was threatened with twenty
years imprisonment, left to sleep on the floor in a de-
tention area at the airport, and then imprisoned for
over six weeks before his claim to citizenship was vali-
dated by an immigration judge.
• A mother and daughter from a Peruvian family that
had suffered multiple death threats from a guerrilla
group arrived in the U.S. and requested asylum. The
two were immediately separated, and the mother, who
was detained in a criminal facility, made a decision to
abandon her claim after she was told that she faced
many weeks of detention and continued separation
from her daughter. Her husband has since been
granted asylum in the United States.
• A Coptic Christian asylum seeker fleeing religious per-
secution in Egypt alleges that an ins officer expressed
hostility and religious bias during secondary inspec-
tion, which frightened him into retracting his claim
for asylum.23
Another troubling aspect of expedited removal is its
application to individuals with facially valid travel docu-
ments, such as a person with a tourist visa suspected of an
intent to work in the United States. The Study has docu-
mented cases of refusals to admit persons to the U.S., based
on questionable judgment calls or mistaken understandings
of the controlling law.24 One Mexican teenager who was
spending the summer in Texas with her sister, her sister’s
husband, and their baby, before attending college in Mexico,
was found inadmissible on the ground that she was help-
ing to care for her infant niece—an activity judged, incor-
rectly, to be incompatible with a tourist visa.25
In addition, widely varying rates in the application of
expedited removal at the northern and southern borders
and at different ports of entry, noted both by the Study
and by the gao, raise questions about whether uniform le-
gal criteria are being applied in a non-uniform manner.
Immigration officers have the discretion to allow individu-
als they judge inadmissible to withdraw their applications
for admission and depart the port of entry without being
issued an order of removal and its five-year bar on entry.26
usins has reported significant variation in withdrawal
rates—from 27 per cent at southern (Mexican) land ports
to 95 per cent at northern (Canadian) land ports. The rate
at airports was 39 per cent.27 And the Study has documented
striking variations in the percentage of expedited remov-
als for different major nationalities and ports of entry.28
Further concerns about expedited removal have been
raised because of its impact on individuals other than asy-
lum seekers. There are many reports of U.S. citizens of His-
panic and African-American ethnicity who have been ques-
tioned, detained, and even removed from the United
States.29 The actions of usins officers implementing expe-
dited removal have also raised controversy about the treat-
ment of business travellers and tourists.30 And of course
the most notable impact of expedited removal is on the
U.S.-Mexican border and on Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans.
One troubling finding is the extent to which expedited
removal has quickly become a central pillar of usins policy.
Approximately half of all removals from the U.S. in fiscal
years 1999 and 2000 were made under expedited removal’s
abbreviated procedures.31 While the legislation to enact ex-
pedited removal was proposed, justified, and attacked
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almost entirely as a strategy for handling fraudulent asy-
lum claims,32 in practice, expedited removal appears to be
in large part about exercising control over the U.S.-Mexico
border. One land port of entry near San Diego, Califor-
nia—San Ysidro—accounted by itself for fully 44 per cent
of all expedited removals over the first three years of the
law’s application.33 And nine of the ten ports of entry with
the highest numbers of expedited removals are land ports
on the U.S.-Mexico border; together, these entry points
made up over 80 per cent of all expedited removals.34
However, the fact that the overwhelming number of in-
dividuals subjected to expedited removal are Mexican na-
tionals should not deflect attention from the law’s impact
on asylum seekers. The gao found that 19 per cent of those
arriving at U.S. airports and placed in expedited removal—
one out of every five persons—expressed a fear of being
returned to their homeland. And for these asylum seekers,
the law’s lightening-fast procedures coupled with the ab-
sence of any judicial review constitute a troubling new ob-
stacle to be overcome before they may find safety.35
Credible Fear
The Study has consistently raised questions about the ad-
equacy of expedited proceedings for making complex
determinations in asylum cases, such as whether the claim
has a nexus to one of the five grounds for asylum.36 As noted
above, the credible fear interview is an initial screening
process to determine whether a person should be permit-
ted to apply for asylum, and it is not intended to be a full
asylum hearing.37 However, “nexus” or “on account of”
determinations can involve highly complicated factual and
legal issues that may well be aided by fuller factual devel-
opment than is possible in the expedited removal process.
The percentage of individuals passing their credible fear
interviews has risen from 82 per cent in fiscal year 1997 to
98 per cent in 1999.38 But this fact does not eliminate con-
cerns over the fact that the credible fear regime has no ba-
sis in international law and in its implementation may place
the U.S. in violation of its responsibilities under the Refu-
gee Convention. On its face, the “significant possibility” re-
quirement39 is a far higher standard than the “manifestly
unfounded” test that the unhcr has suggested countries
may employ; the unhcr has submitted that such a stand-
ard should be used only to screen out claims that are “so
obviously without foundation as to not merit full exami-
nation at every level of procedure.”40 The high passage rate
may indicate that the credible fear regime is currently op-
erating as something like a “manifestly unfounded” test.
But it also indicates that the legislation’s concern with sup-
posedly large numbers of people abusing the U.S. asylum
system was unfounded.
Recently, the usins drafted regulations that would per-
mit asylum officers to grant asylum after a credible fear
interview to persons who have established not only a cred-
ible fear of persecution, but also the higher standard of
“well-founded fear” required for asylum.41 Such a rule could
move the U.S. still further away from the international
“manifestly unfounded” standard by investing further sub-
stantive importance to what is supposed to be a screening
interview. A few asylum seekers would certainly benefit
from an early grant and release from detention. But the
holding of an in-depth interview at this early stage of the
process—when legal representatives and live interpreters are
rarely present and applicants may be hesitant to speak about
the trauma they have suffered—could well result in adverse
consequences to the great majority of asylum seekers who
will not be granted asylum at the credible fear interview.
Canadian-Bound Asylum Seekers
A notable consequence of expedited removal, one that was
presumably unintended, is its impact on Canadian-bound
asylum seekers who seek to transit through the United
States. Many people who seek to travel to Canada through
the U.S. have been placed in expedited removal, including
a large number of Sri Lankans with relatives in Canada;
the irony is that a process designed to screen people out
instead may leave them with no option but to attempt to
remain in the United States. The resulting transnational
migration policy issues have occupied the attention of nu-
merous refugee advocates in Canada and the United States
and, to a lesser extent, the immigration authorities in both
countries.42
Before the enactment of expedited removal, individuals
were relatively free to travel through the U.S. by land or air
to neighbouring countries. Today, persons seeking refugee
status in other countries who transit through the United
States may be placed in expedited removal proceedings. In
order to avoid immediate removal and return, such a per-
son must immediately identify herself as an asylum seeker,
be referred to an asylum officer, and be found to have a
credible fear of persecution. Once this hurdle has been
passed, the individual will be detained and must apply for
release via parole. While usins parole policies vary in dif-
ferent regions, few if any asylum Canadian-bound indi-
viduals appear to have been paroled in the majority of usins
districts. The New York district, through which a great
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number of these asylum seekers attempt to transit, is re-
nowned among immigration advocates for its restrictive
parole practices.
Those not granted parole must apply for asylum in the
United States in order to avoid removal to their country of
citizenship or residence. A grant of asylum in the United
States is a bar to eligibility for refugee status in Canada,43
and may preclude a person from reuniting with family and
friends or living in a region where he or she has commu-
nity ties. Thus, the practice of placing Canadian-bound
refugees in expedited removal and detaining them raises
significant humanitarian and policy concerns.
Refugee advocates point to international law in support
of their position that asylum seekers should be permitted
to transit through the United States to Canada. The unhcr
has stated that “[t]he intentions of the asylum seeker as
regards the country in which he wishes to request asylum
should as far as possible be taken into account,” and
“[r]egard should be had to the concept that asylum should
not be refused solely on the ground that it could be sought
from another State . . .”44 And unhcr has observed that
“[i]n application of the principle of the unity of the family
and for obvious humanitarian reasons, every effort should
be made to ensure the reunification of separated refugee
families.”45
This issue has been raised in meetings with Citizenship
and Immigration Canada (cic) and in discussions with the
usins. ngos suggested that cic allow asylum seekers de-
tained in the United States to make refugee claims through
the Canadian embassy, expedite family sponsorships where
the asylum seeker has relatives in Canada, and grant Min-
ister’s Permits to allow entrance into Canada. cic declined
to adopt the ngos suggestions, stating,
Canada is committed to upholding humanitarian obligations
through our protection and selection systems. At the same
time, it is important to control the illegal movement and smug-
gling of people. In these efforts, cic works closely with other
countries, such as the U.S., with which we have a reciprocal
arrangement for the exchange of deportees.
As you will recall, ngo’s [sic] in Canada and the U.S.
strongly opposed the now defunct responsibility sharing
Memorandum of Agreement which had the dual objective of
ensuring access to protection in either territory and curtail-
ing “asylum shopping”. Neither is there, at this time, a regional
regime in place to manage asylum. In the absence of such ar-
rangements, it is difficult to intervene in cases in process in
the U.S. While many cases may deserve empathy, the indi-
viduals concerned are in a signatory country of the Geneva
Convention.46
An alternative strategy to aid Canadian-bound asylum
seekers involves seeking withholding of removal, rather
than asylum, in cases where asylum seekers would meet
the higher standard required. Unlike asylum, withholding
is generally not a bar to refugee status in Canada, and upon
a grant the person may be released from detention and
proceed to the border to submit a refugee status claim.
Conclusion
The expedited removal law has to date been successfully
shielded from legal and constitutional challenge. The law
as drafted required that any legal action challenging the
validity of the expedited removal process had to be filed
within sixty days of its April 1, 1997, implementation.47 Law-
suits were filed within the deadline, arguing among other
things that expedited removal violated protections guar-
anteed by the U.S. Constitution and international law.48 But
the challenges were rejected on narrow jurisdictional
grounds,49 and thus no court has considered the merits of
these important arguments. It is difficult to believe that a
statute can shield itself from challenge in such a manner,
and that no U.S. court will ever address the legality of ex-
pedited removal.50
Judicial review is a protection generally agreed to be a
basic and fundamental check on executive action in order
to ensure due process of law, the correction of errors, and
the protection of an individual’s rights. Unfortunately, the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a person seeking ad-
mission to the United States has no constitutional rights
with respect to her application for admission; the Court
has gone so far as to state that “[w]hatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an al-
ien denied entry is concerned.”51 The judicial review-stripping
provisions of the expedited removal laws make abundantly
clear that the time has come to revisit this troubling prec-
edent.52 The alternative may be the gradual acceptance of
the elimination of judicial review into other areas of ad-
ministrative law.53 Before Canada considers going down a
similar road, it would do well to consider the experience of
the United States—lessons that the U.S. has itself yet to
learn.
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